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ABSTRACT
The 2016 United States presidential election was marked by the
abuse of targeted advertising on Facebook. Concerned with the
risk of the same kind of abuse to happen in the 2018 Brazilian elec-
tions, we designed and deployed an independent auditing system
to monitor political ads on Facebook in Brazil. To do that we first
adapted a browser plugin to gather ads from the timeline of vol-
unteers using Facebook. We managed to convince more than 2000
volunteers to help our project and install our tool. Then, we use a
Convolution Neural Network (CNN) to detect political Facebook
ads using word embeddings. To evaluate our approach, we manu-
ally label a data collection of 10k ads as political or non-political
and then we provide an in-depth evaluation of proposed approach
for identifying political ads by comparing it with classic supervised
machine learning methods. Finally, we deployed a real system that
shows the ads identified as related to politics. We noticed that not
all political ads we detected were present in the Facebook Ad Li-
brary for political ads. Our results emphasize the importance of
enforcement mechanisms for declaring political ads and the need
for independent auditing platforms.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems→ Social networks; Social advertising.
KEYWORDS
Misinformation, political ads, Facebook, transparency mechanisms
1 INTRODUCTION
The 2016 United States presidential election was marked by an
information war that took place into different social media plat-
forms [6, 34]. In particular, the election was marked by the abuse of
targeted advertising on Facebook; a group of Russian citizens and
companies were indicted by U.S. authorities for trying to influence
the 2016 US election through the Facebook Ad Platform [1, 39]. A
recent study characterized a set of ads released by the house of
representatives posted by the Russian company named Internet
Research Agency (IRA) [19]. Their findings show that these ads
received a click-through rate about 10 times higher than the one
for typical ads in Facebook, that ads were ran along two years and
not only during the 2016 election, and that the content of these ads
∗This is a preprint version of a paper that will appear at WWW’20 Conference.
was on polarizing topics (e.g., immigration, race-based policing),
usually targeting vulnerable sub-populations. The case of the IRA
ads clearly raised numerous concerns about external interference
in elections through targeting advertising. Beyond that, it showed
how an ad platform could be used for posting illicit political ads
targeting people susceptible to false stories, stoke grievances, and
incite social conflict. In other words, a platform of this kind could
be abused to engineer polarization in a country, which could end
up favoring a political campaign.
As an answer to these new threats, Facebook implemented sev-
eral countermeasures. On May 24, 2018, Facebook changed its ToS
policy to allow the launching of political ads only by advertis-
ers that reside in the same country with the people targeted (this
requirement does not apply to non-political ads) [31]. Also, all
election-related ads must be clearly labeled as such, including a
“Paid for by” disclosure from the advertiser at the top of the ad.
On June 28, 2018, Facebook launched a page to show the “active
campaigns” of advertisers that send political ads that are accessible
from their corresponding Facebook Pages [16] (this service was a
test pilot only available in Canada before the Brazilian elections
between Aug. 16 – Oct. 28, 2018). Finally, in June 2018 Facebook
launched the Facebook Ad Library [2, 14], a service that allows
people to see all the ads declared as political by the advertisers
posting them as well as information about who paid for the ad,
the amount spent, the number of impressions delivered, and the
audience. A fewweeks after that, Facebook launched the Ad Library
to Brazilian citizens [2].
While these measures were welcomed, many people including
researchers, journalists and organisations pointed out that they
are not sufficient [3, 35, 38]. First, advertisers have to declare them-
selves, on a voluntary basis, whether they are sending political
ads. This is problematic because dishonest political parties and
presidential candidates can avoid scrutiny of their ad messages
by not declaring them as political. Second, beyond public opinion
manipulation and spread of fake news, the Facebook ads platform
can also be used for slush funds [9]. Brazilian electoral law states
that companies are prohibited to make donations to any political
party or candidate during the election period. Currently, dishonest
companies can spend an unlimited amount of undeclared money in
favor of a political agenda through the Facebook ads platform [51].
Third, the Facebook Ad Library does not offer information regard-
ing the targeting used by advertisers. A recent study found out
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that Facebook makes available to advertisers more than 240,000
interests that it has inferred about its users, such as “Yoga”, “Gluten-
free”, or “Adult Children of Alcoholics” [47] . Combinations of these
interests can result in uncontrollable ways of reaching very specific
sub-populations vulnerable to specific messages.
Advertisers of political content are supposed to both comply with
the Facebook’s Terms of Service as well as the election legislation
in their respective countries. In October 2017, Brazilian authorities
demanded that political figures that are advertising on Facebook
political content along the electoral period, an established period
near the elections, need to give information about their national
identification numbers, namely CPF, for individuals, and CNPJ, for
companies. Facebook responded by creating an interface that allows
advertisers of political content to include disclosure information
in their ads related to elections and also their CNPJs or CPFs (see
Figure 1). However, Facebook we are unsure whether they deployed
any enforcement mechanisms for tagging political ads that try to
run without the right disclaimer in Brazil.
Concerned by the eminent high potential misuse of Facebook
ads and imminent risks to Brazilian electoral laws, we designed and
deployed a system to monitor political ads on Facebook, named
Facebook AdMonitor12. Our tool is a Chrome and Firefox extension
that users can install on their computers and that collects the ads
users see when they check their Facebook timeline as well as the
corresponding explanations from the “Why am I seeing this ad?”
feature that reveals some information about the targeting used
by the advertisers [4]. Our tool is similar with the tools provided
by ProPublica [45] and WhoTargetsMe [54], but it is customized
for collecting and analyzing ads in Portuguese besides English. In
addition, we developed a web application that runs our political ad
classifier and allows Brazilian authorities and citizens to monitor
the Facebook ads that our browser extension has collected. The
classifier calculates the political probability score for each ad we
collect. Our web application has a search engine where anyone can
search and perform filters over our data. Our hope was that the
detection of a single illegal ad is enough to incur strict penalties
and, hopefully, to inhibit the proliferation of such ads.
To disseminate the tool we wrote and published opinion articles
on the media disclosing ways in which online systems can be ex-
ploited to influence elections and what we can do about them[9, 48].
We also presented these threats in the Brazilian senate.34 Our tool
was installed by more than 2000 users, out of which 715 users ac-
tively used the tool along the election period, providing us all the
ads they received while navigating on Facebook. This collaborative
effort provided us with a dataset containing 239k ads from 40k
advertisers along the period of March 14, 2018 to October 28, 2018.
We implemented several machine learning-based techniques for
detecting political ads on Facebook. We tested supervised classifiers
such as Naive Bayes, Random Forest, Logistic Regression, SVM
and Gradient Boosting as well as a recently proposed Convolution
Neural Network (CNN) built to detect political tweets. To evaluate
our algorithms we created a golden standard test collection with
1https://www.eleicoessemfake.dcc.ufmg.br/anuncios
2The extension has been forked from adanalyst.mpi-sws.org.
3https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2018/05/11/impacto-das-
midias-sociais-para-o-legislativo-sera-discutido-em-seminario-no-senado
4https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eGScrdi5hhU&t=3450s
Figure 1: Example of an official political ad posted during
the election period in Brazil.
20k ads labeled as political or non-political.5 Our results show that
the CNN-based model is able to achieve an AUC of 98% and an
accuracy of 94% in a near balanced dataset or a 78% true positive
rate for a 1% false positive rate.
We tested the CNN classifier over a dataset of 38k ads containing
ads in Portuguese during the electoral period (August 16, 2018 to
October 28, 2018), and we found 835 (approx 2%) of the ads to be
political. Even if we only have a small sample of ads running on the
platform, our results show that there are many ads with political
content that were detected by our algorithm and were not labeled
as such on Facebook.
Our study emphasize the importance of enforcement mecha-
nisms for declaring political ads. The big open questions, however,
are (i) who is responsible for enforcing the election legislation?;
and (ii) how can authorities be able to enforce laws if they do not
have access to data? While companies and politicians are debating
how to regulate political ads [44, 49], we believe one potential so-
lution could be independent auditing platforms such as ours that
collect ads from volunteers and search for undeclared political ads.
We show that it is feasible to build such a platform and have a
positive impact in the real world. Our auditing platform is online
(https://adanalyst.mpi-sws.org/) and we plan to monitor other elec-
tions as well. Furthermore, to facilitate the development of new
auditing platforms, our code is open source and some parts of our
data are public.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides the necessary background on the Brazilian election legisla-
tion and how the Facebook ad platform works. Section 3 describes
our dataset and data collection method. Section 4 describes our
5Dataset and code available at https://lig-membres.imag.fr/gogao/political_ads.
html.
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algorithms for detecting political ads and Section 5 describes the
results and findings after deploying our system in the real-world.
Finally, Section 6, highlights our contributions in comparison with
related studies.
2 BACKGROUND
This section provides background on the Brazilian election and
legal requirements for advertising political content, as well as how
advertising on Facebook works, what are the platform’s Terms of
Service regarding political content, and transparency mechanisms
provided. Note that there is a distinction between the legal require-
ments from state legislation that advertisers have to follow, and
the requirements advertisers need to respect due to the ToS of
Facebook.
2.1 Brazilian Election Legislation
In Brazil elections occur every four years and are divided between
national and local elections. In national elections, Brazilian citizens
choose their president, governors, deputy-governors, state repre-
sentatives, senators and congressmen in all 26 states and the Federal
District. Local elections are for choosing mayors and councilors.
The 2018 presidential elections in Brazil had two rounds. To win
the election directly in the first round a candidate should have at
least 50% of the valid votes, which was not the case in 2018. The
voting period for both rounds last only a single day. In 2018, the first
round was in October 7 and the second round in October 28. From
August 16 onward, electoral advertising, such as rallies, caravans,
distribution of graphic material and advertising on the Internet was
permitted.
For electoral advertisements on the Internet, Resolution No.
23,551 of the Superior Electoral Court of Brazil 6 stipulated a series
of rules in order to ensure greater transparency for campaign spend-
ing. For advertisements on social networks, such as on Facebook,
chapter IV of the resolution stipulates that they can be made or
edited by:
• candidates, political parties or coalitions;
• any natural person (e.g. a bot or a fake profile is not a natural
person), as long as they do not pay for content promotion.
Meaning that they can only promote candidates through
regular posts and not sponsored ads.
In addition, any promoted content must contain, in a clear and
legible form, the registration number in the National Register of
Legal Entities (CNPJ) 7 or the registration number in the Register
of Individuals (CPF) 8 of the responsible person, in addition to
the expression “Electoral Advertising” (in Portuguese: Propaganda
Eleitoral).
Also, Paragraph 4 of Article 23 of the resolution stipulates that
the Internet application provider (e.g., Facebook) that allows paid
political content to be promoted must clearly communicate this to
its users. In compliance with this law, Facebook provides an inter-
face for political agents to properly register their advertisements
6http://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/arquivos/resolucao-23551-nova/
rybena_pdf?file=http://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/arquivos/resolucao-23551-
nova/at_download/file
7An identification number issued to Brazilian companies by the Department of
Federal Revenue of Brazil.
8The Brazilian individual taxpayer registry identification.
during the election period. Figure 1 shows an example of a political
ad properly promoted on Facebook using this interface. All the
respective expenses with those ads needed to be declared to the
Superior Electoral Court.
2.2 Regular Advertising on Facebook
Any user with an active profile and Facebook page can become an
advertiser. All they need to do is activate their ad account, select
a targeting audience, fine-tune parameters such as bidding, and
they can automatically send ads to their desired audience [50]. This
means that everyone with a Facebook account can spread content
about products, ideas, or even malicious information and fake news.
Facebook offers a multitude of audience selection options that
can enable advertisers to target in a way which is considerably
more fine-grained than traditional online advertising platforms
like Google [22]. Apart from traditional targeting options, like age,
gender, location, and language, advertisers can use - and combine
in formulas - a variety of attributes to target users. Advertisers can
target users that have their birthday next month, or are interested in
common subjects like Games or Food, but they can also target users
interested in much more sensitive attributes such as Homosexuality,
or Fascism. In fact, there exist more than 240,000 available attributes
for advertisers to choose from [47], including at least 2092 poten-
tially sensitive attributes [8]. Additionally, advertisers can target
users through custom audiences [47] by uploading to Facebook lists
of users’ Personally Identifiable Information (PII), such as phone
numbers, emails, or names and physical addresses. Or, they can
target lookalike audiences, users that resemble some another desired
user group according to Facebook [17]. These targeting options are
naturally not only at the disposal of benign advertisers, but also
malicious advertisers with ill intents.
2.3 Political Advertising on Facebook
Regardless of Brazilian (or any other country) regulations, adver-
tisers who want to send political ads on Facebook are subject to
higher levels of scrutiny and the corresponding ads are subject to
higher levels of transparency. Facebook defines an ad as political
when [15, 18]:
(i) it is made by, on behalf of or about a current or former candidate
for public office, a political party, a political action committee or
advocates for the outcome of an election to public office; or
(ii) it relates to any election, referendum or ballot initiative, including
"get out the vote" or election information campaigns; or (iii) it relates
to any national legislative issue of public importance in any place
where the ad is being run; or
(iv) it is regulated as political advertising.
(v) it is related to issues of public importance: abortion, budget, civil
rights, crime, economy, education, energy, environment, foreign pol-
icy, government reform, guns, health, immigration, infrastructure,
military, poverty, social security, taxes, and terrorism
Note that this is not the only definition for what is a political ad
and scholars and regulators are currently debating about defini-
tions [55].
To sponsor political content on Facebook, advertisers need to
first verify their accounts, declare that their ad is about political or
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social issues and put a disclaimer that mentions who paid for the
ad.9
2.4 The Facebook Ad Library
The ads declared by advertisers as containing political content are
part of the historical Facebook Ad Library.While Facebook provides
functionalities for advertisers to include disclosure information
about their political ads, we do not know whether Facebook has
any kind of enforcement mechanisms for detecting political ads
that do not have the appropriate disclosure in Brazil.
3 SYSTEM FOR MONITORING ADS
This section describes our tool and the datasets we collected for
this study.
3.1 Tool Design
Our tool is a browser extension (for Chrome and Firefox) that
collects the ads that appear in the Facebook feed of the volunteers
who install it. We forked AdCollector from AdAnalyst10, and we
added support for collecting and analyzing ads in the Portuguese
language as well as an interface in Portuguese where users can
browse the ads we collect.
To capture the ads that users receive on Facebook, we scrape the
Facebook’s HTML and we look for the tag “Sponsored” (“Patroci-
nado” in Portuguese). This tag is used by Facebook to help users
distinguish sponsored content from the rest. The captured frame
contains the media content of the ad (either a video, an image, or a
collection of images), the text of the ad, and a link to the advertiser’s
page. Our browser extension does not collect ads that appear when
a user is watching a video on Facebook.
Facebook provides explanations to users on why they have re-
ceived a specific ad. To obtain such explanations, users need to click
on the “Why am I seeing this?” button that is in the upper right
corner of every ad. These explanations provide some information
regarding the parameters set by the advertisers, but not all [5]. We
also instrument the browser extension to collect these explanations.
Ethical considerations: We only collect information about the ads
and clearly state what we collect to the volunteers who install the
extension and accept our terms. We do not collect any information
about friends list, likes, photos, videos or regular timeline posts.
Furthermore, the code of our extension is open source and it is
publicly available 5.
3.2 Dissemination and Deployment
The initial users who installed our browser extension were friends
and family. Later, our browser extension was widely adopted after
our project was cited by popular national and international news
media outlets such as BBC, El País, Finantial Times, and Folha de
São Paulo 11. Additionally, to disseminate the tool, we wrote and
published opinion articles to disclose ways to exploit online systems
to influence elections and what we can do about them [9, 48]. These
9https://www.facebook.com/business/help/208949576550051?id=
288762101909005
10https://adanalyst.mpi-sws.org/
11http://www.eleicoes-sem-fake.dcc.ufmg.br/?section=midia
Figure 2: Number of daily active users.
risks were then exposed by our team in the Brazilian senate and in
multiple national TV shows12.
3.3 Data Collection
We used AdCollector to monitor ads from March 14, 2018 to
October 28, 2018. This period covers the electoral period, including
the two voting rounds. Overall, more than 2,000 users volunteered
to install our browser extension and share the ads they received
while navigating on Facebook with our project. We noted, however,
that many users only installed the browser extension but do not
used it. Nevertheless, a total of 715 users actively used our tool in
this period.
Figure 2 shows the number of active users per day. We consider a
user as active in a day if they received at least one Facebook ad. The
number of daily users increased rapidly when several news-media
outlets published articles about our system and stayed relatively
stable afterward. The sudden decrease of active users in mid-June
can be attributed to a change Facebook makes in the way it tags ads,
resulting in the loss of ads for some days. We also notice that user
activity on weekends decreases, which might indicate that some
users have installed our plugin in their computer at work.
Out of the 715 users, 682 are from Brazil. We inferred this tar-
geting information by parsing the data from the "Why am I seeing
this?" explanations that were collected by our extension [5]. We
collected in total 239k unique ads sent by 40k advertisers. Each
ad is identified by an unique id provided by Facebook. Out of the
239k unique ads, 166k were sent during the pre-electoral period
(March 2018 to August 15, 2018) and 74k were sent during the elec-
toral period (August 16, 2018 to October 28, 2018). For each ad we
have information about the advertiser, the text of the ad, the text
in the political ad disclaimer, the image (when available) and the
landing URL. We refer to this dataset as the AdCollector dataset.
Official political ads are different than regular ads. Besides the
“Sponsored” tag, the disclaimer also contains the tag “Electoral
Propaganda”. Because of that, our extension did not collect these
ads, i.e., the dataset collected with our browser extension does not
contain any official political ad.
12https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eGScrdi5hhU&t=3450s.
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3.4 Facebook Ad Library Dataset
Facebook provides an Ad Library that includes all ads that were
declared as containing political content by the advertisers 13. The
Ad Library offers a search engine where given a keyword, the
engine returns matching advertisers and their ads. Facebook lists
the top 30 results for the query and provides a token for the next
page. We implemented a crawler to perform automatic searches
and scrape the results provided this application. In August 2018, the
search engine allowed to query empty strings and was returning
a long list of ads sorted by the publish time. We collected all the
returned results until the last page. Unfortunately, the Facebook Ad
Library changed a lot during the past 2 years, which might make
this collection method not possible anymore 14.
We tried to collect close to all ads declared as political. To do that,
we repeated the task of querying for an empty string periodically
during the period of Aug 2018 to December 2019, a total of 11
complete crawls. Each additional crawl increased our dataset by
an average of 2.63%. Additionally, to measure how many ads we
missed, we performed a hundred searches with distinct random
words selected from a Wikipedia dataset [56]. This experiment
revealed that our dataset increased, in total, by 2.59%, or by an
average of .0259% for each search. While we believe we are close
to have the entire dataset of political ads, there is not a systematic
way to assess the amount we of ads we did not gathered. As also
observed by others, the Facebook Ad Library is unstable and there
are ads that appear and ads that disappear each day which makes
it impossible to know for sure how many ads we miss [3].
For each ad, Facebook returns the advertiser’s name, the adver-
tiser’s Brazilian tax id, the ad text, the ad media (video or images),
how much money was spent on the ad and information about the
age, the gender and the location of the users reached. We filter out
ads that did not reach people in Brazil and are not marked as being
about political, election and social issues.15 Our curated dataset
contains 100,778 unique ads from 5,292 advertisers during the
electoral period and all ads gathered are specific to Brazil. We refer
to this dataset as the FbAdLibrary dataset.
4 DETECTING POLITICAL ADS
There is no consensus on what is a political ad. Different platforms
have different definitions for what they consider as political ads [23,
44], while at the same time political scholars and regulators are
debating about what would be a good definition [43].
Our goal in this work is not to provide the best definition for a
political ad, but to operationalize one that is able to identify ads
that are similar to self-declared political ads. More specifically, our
approach consists on investigating to which extent we can build
machine-learning algorithms that are able to accurately identify
similar ads from those available in the Facebook political Ad Library.
In practice, our approach has three key steps. First, we need to
create a gold standard collection of ads used to test our method.
13https://www.facebook.com/politicalcontentads
14The task of building and maintaining this crawler is not straightforward. Face-
book constantly updates the URL parameters of search queries and implements coun-
termeasures to detect and block crawlers.
15The new version of the Ad Library also returns active campaigns of advertisers
that can include ads that are not political. We exclude these ads from the dataset as
well.
Then, we select a supervised classifier that receives as input an
ad and outputs if it is political , i.e., of the same nature as the
ones registered as such on Facebook, or non-political. Finally, we
evaluate this classifier over different sets of testing data.
4.1 Gold standard collection
To train and test our machine learning models we need a labeled
set of political and non-political ads. Next, we describe our assump-
tions and how we create a set of political and non-political ads.
Political ads: As political ads, we choose a uniformly distributed
random sample of 10, 000 ads from the FbAdLibrary dataset. As
these ads were made by political candidates or political parties as
part of their official political campaigns, they are good represen-
tative instances of political ads for training our machine learning-
based methods. Our rationale is that, independent of the definition
of a political ad, our data-driven approach might be able to properly
recognize an ad that is similar to those self-declared political ads
made by real political agents.
Non-political ads: There are no available existing labeled datasets
for non-political ads. Thus, we need to label such ads ourselves. We
selected a uniformly distributed random sample of 10, 000 ads from
the AdCollector dataset. Although most of the ads in this dataset
are not about politics, there are a few political ads among them.
So, we asked three independent volunteers16 to label the ads as
political or non-political. We instructed the volunteers to consider
as political ads the ads declared on Facebook as Political and Issue
ads, as well as ads that correspond to the definition proposed by
Oliveira et al. [40]:
Definition 1. A political advertisement in Facebook is a spon-
sored message posted on a Facebook page whose content expresses
subjects related to state, politics, governance, and justice. Specifically,
such messages may cover one or more of the following topics: political
campaign; human rights; political activism; political news; federal pro-
grams projects and laws; politician public agenda; judicial decisions;
public expenditures and crimes against public administration.
We evaluated the inter-rater reliability among the independent
volunteers using the agreement percentage and the Cohen’s Kappa
coefficient (κ) [30, 41, 46]. This coefficient measures the agreement
between two volunteers who each classify a predefined number of
ads as one of the two mutually exclusive categories: political or non-
political. The agreement among the three volunteers is consistently
very high, 99.7% for volunteers 1 and 2, with κ = 0.93, and 99.5%
for volunteers 1 and 3, with κ = 0.88. For volunteers 2 and 3
the agreement is 99.5%, with κ = 0.89. According to Landis and
Koch [30], these Kappa scores fall into the range of scores referred
to as “Almost Perfect” agreement, which is a satisfactory result that
validates our gold standard collection. The labeled data contains 233
political ads and 9, 767 non-political ads. We added the 233 political
ads as part of our political ads dataset. Our final Gold Standard
collection is a nearly balanced dataset containing 10,233 political
ads and 9,767 non-political ads.17
16The volunteers were students in our lab.
17This dataset is publicly available to download at https://lig-membres.imag.fr/
gogao/political_ads.html.
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4.2 Supervised learning algorithms
We evaluate five classifying techniques to distinguish between
political and non-political ads: Logistic Regression, Random Forest,
Support Vector Machine with RBF kernel, and Gradient Boosting
using Grid Search for selecting best hyperparameters during the
train and Word Embedding for feature extraction, and Naive Bayes
using Hashing Vectorizer for feature extraction.
We also implemented a Convolution Neural Network (CNN) ar-
chitecture recently proposed for a similar task: identifying political
tweets posted by politicians [40]. Figure 3 presents an overview of
our implementation. We represent each word of a Facebook ad as
a dense vector retrieved from Word2Vec C-BoW with 300 dimen-
sions, pre-trained over a large Portuguese data set, which is able
to produce an embedding matrix for a vocabulary of 1.3 trillion
terms [24, 37]. Thus, the input layer is a matrix n × 300, where n is
the number of words in a particular ad and 300 is the vector rep-
resentation of each word of this message. Subsequently, there is a
25% rate dropout regularization layer connected to a convolutional
layer with 120 different filters and sizes (3,4,5), activated by a ReLU
function. Then, the output of the previous layer is connected to a
global max-polling layer, whose output is in turn, fully connected to
a ReLU activation and to another 25% rate dropout layer. Finally, the
last dense layer is a single neuron with a sigmoid activation func-
tion that outputs 1 if the message is political, and 0 if non-political.
We optimized the neural network by means of cross entropy loss
function using the RMSProp optimization algorithm [11].
4.3 Evaluation
We use 10-fold cross validation to train and test the six classi-
fiers. We partition the Gold Standard dataset in ten random sub-
samples, out of which nine are used as training data, and the remain-
ing one is used for testing the classifier. The results reported are
averages of the 10 runs along with their 90%-confidence intervals.
To evaluate the classifiers we considered three classic metrics:
accuracy, Macro-F1, and the area under the ROC curve (AUC).
Accuracy considers equally important the correct classification of
each ad, independently of the class, and basically measures the
capability of the method to predict the correct output. As the Gold
Standard dataset is nearly balanced, the results for accuracy are
meaningful. The resulting AUC is the probability that a model will
rank a randomly chosen political ad higher (e.g. more political)
than a randomly chosen ad. The AUC is especially relevant for
political ad detection since the decision threshold can be used to
control the trade-off between true and false positive rates. Finally,
Macro-F1 values are computed by first calculating F1 values (a
metric that captures both precision and recall for a 0.5 threshold)
for each class in isolation, then averaging over all classes. This
way, Macro-F1 considers equally important the effectiveness in
each class, independently of the relative size of the class. Besides
that, the Macro-F1 score is the harmonic mean of the precision and
recall.
Table 1 presents the accuracy, AUC and Macro-F1 score for the
six classifiers we consider. The accuracy of CNN, SVM, Logistic
Regression and Naive Bayes is 94% in a nearly balanced dataset for
detecting both political and non-political ads.
Table 1: Accuracy of different classifiers.
Classifier Accuracy AUC Macro-F1
CNN 0.94(±0.01) 0.98(±0.01) 0.94(±0.01)
SVM 0.94(±0.01) 0.98(±0.01) 0.94(±0.01)
L. Regression 0.94(±0.01) 0.98(±0.01) 0.94(±0.01)
R. Forest 0.92(±0.01) 0.97(±0.01) 0.92(±0.01)
N. Bayes 0.94(±0.01) 0.99(±0.01) 0.94(±0.01)
G. Boosting 0.92(±0.01) 0.97(±0.02) 0.92(±0.01)
Table 2: True Positive Rate (TPR) for 1.0% and 3.0% False Pos-
itive Rate (FPR).
Classifier FPR = 1% FPR 3%
CNN 78% 90%
SVM 57% 85%
L. Regression 58% 85%
R. Forest 62% 83%
N. Bayes 85% 95%
G. Boosting 57% 79%
While our classifiers achieve an impressive accuracy in a nearly
balanced dataset, in the real-world the number of non-political
ads is much higher than the number of political ads. Hence, it is
important to study the ROC curves of classifiers and what true
positive rates (detection of true political ads) they achieve for small
false positive rates (false detection of non-political ads as political
ads). Table 2 shows the true positive rate for a false positive rate of
1% and 3%. We observe that CNN and Naive Bayes classifiers are
the most accurate with true positive rates of 78% and 85% for a 1%
false positive rate.
5 ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL ADS
In this section we investigate how many political ads our classifier
identifies in the AdCollector dataset. From AdCollector we re-
moved the ads that are part of theGold Standard dataset and were
used for training the models, as well as the ads that we collected
outside the election period (March 14, 2018 to August 15, 2018).
We also removed ads that were not in the Portuguese language,
resulting in a set of 58,235 unique ads. Finally, some advertisers
create sets of ads that have the same text but with different images.
In order to not over-represent them we only kept one ad for each
set of ads with multiple images and the same caption. Hence, this
leads us to a set of 38,110 ads. Remember that this dataset does not
contain any official political ad as our browser extensions did not
collect these ads (see Section 3).
We use the CNN model to assign to each ad a probability of
being political. In practice there is a significantly higher number
of non-political ads then political ads (i.e., we have an unbalanced
dataset scenario). To limit the number of false positives (i.e., ads
that are misclassified as political by our model but are actually
non-political) we choose a threshold for declaring an ad as political
that corresponds to a 1% false positive rate (instead of choosing the
typical 0.5 threshold for the probability of being political, which
corresponds to a false positive rate of 8% and true positive rate of
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Figure 3: Convolutional Neural Network architecture for political ads classification.
96%). Using a threshold of 0.97, our CNN model classifies 835 ads as
political out of the 38,110 ads we tested – 2% of the ads are political.
The 835 ads were posted by 577 advertisers. We name the set of
political ads we detect as the Political Ads. Figure 4 shows an
example of such ad. We see that the ad mentions the name of a
candidate and his identification number during the election.
To be sure the ads we detect are indeed about political issues
we picked a random sample of 300 ads that were targeted by 251
advertisers and we manually check them. We found 19 ads that
are not political and 2 ads we are not sure. The ads that were
wrongly classified as political had captions that could mostly be
easily confused by an algorithm; for example an ice-cream shop
was presenting their products as mock-candidates in the election.
This results suggest that at least 2% of the ads in our dataset
contain political content and are not part of the FacebookAd Library.
Note that our threshold for declaring political ads was very high
and there might be many other political ads we do not detect due
to this high threshold. This means that although a law exists to
enforce the disclosure and registration of political ads on Facebook
during the elections, there is still a considerable amount of political
ads being broadcast that are not disclosed properly.
Compliance with the Brazilian election law:
Disclosure: We observed that some advertisers, even if they do not
declare their ad as political on Facebook, they mention in the text
of their ad the keywords “Propaganda Electoral” or “Propaganda
Política”, and their CPF or CNPJ tax id numbers, as required by
the Brazilian law. We identified 90 such ads coming from 53 adver-
tisers in Political Ads. While, these advertisers comply with the
Brazilian election law, their ads are not declared to Facebook and,
hence, are not part of the Facebook Ad Library, thus evading future
scrutiny. Note that, we have not checked if any of these advertisers
declared their spending to the electoral court, to verify if the whole
process is compliant.
Type of advertiser: Only political parties and politicians were al-
lowed by law in Brazil to launch political ads during the electoral
Figure 4: Ad text posted together with this ad image trans-
lated to English: I am meeting friends, making new friends and
bringing my message as a state deputy candidate to all residents
of Marmelópolis (MG). Let’s go together! A NEW LOOK FOR
MINDS Political Advertising: CNPJ 31.208.669/001-05 #Marmelópo-
lis #ANewLooking ForMines #DrRobertoBob20200.
period, which is the period considered in our analysis. We manually
checked who posted each ad from our sample of 300 ads. Out of
the 232 advertisers who posted clear political ads, we detected 15
advertisers that are news organizations, and 28 advertisers that
were neither news organizations, nor political parties or politicians.
Many of these advertisers –especially news organizations– fre-
quently covered news, debate events, interviews e.t.c., however, we
also identified 21 ads (from 12 advertisers) whose message was di-
rectly related to politics, often clearly advocating political agendas.
For example, an NGO named Sou Da Paz was advocating through 9
ads for several agendas related to reducing gun violence, crime rates
e.t.c., while a community named Esquerda Marxista placed 2 ads
with heavy ideological undertone, one of which directly criticized
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Jair Bolsonaro. Table 3 shows a (translated) ad for each of the two
advertisers (AD5 and AD6, respectively).
Representation in the Ad Library: The ads in Political Ads were
not declared as political on Facebook and hence are not part of the
Ad Library. To check whether there might be versions of these ads
that are part of the Ad Library, for each ad in Political Ads we
extract the text of the ad and we check if the text matches any of
the ads in the FbAdLibrary dataset. Only 34 of the 835 ads have
a corresponding ad in FbAdLibrary. This shows that for a small
fraction of ads, the advertisers had some ads that were compliant
with the Facebook’s ToS but also similar versions of the same ad
that were not.
Differences between ads in Political Ads dataset and the
FbAdLibrary dataset: In Table 3 we show (translated) examples
of ads from FbAdLibrary and Political Ads. We do not see a
clear distinction among ads of each group as they both contain
explicit publicity material for candidates as well as ads related to the
elections but not to particular campaigns. This sample of examples
illustrates the importance of having collaborative systems that
enable the participation of the society on the process of uncovering
(potentially suspicious) political campaign actions.
6 RELATEDWORK
Social networks rise as a new battlefield during elections and the
Facebook ad platform was shown to be quite effective in many
marketing segments, including political advertising.18 We review
related efforts along four axes: (i) studies related to sentiment anal-
ysis on political content, (ii) studies focused on Facebook ads, (iii)
studies on the relationship between social media and the general
public, and (iv) studies on the social media influence on election
results.
Detection of political content and sentiment.Durant et al. [12]
implemented automatic techniques that identify the political senti-
ment of web blog posts and help bloggers categorize and filter this
exploding information source. Bakliwal et al. [7] also implemented
a classifier for sentiment analysis, but they have not detected polit-
ical content, only sentiments. In contrast, Oliveira et al. [40] built a
CNN (Convolutional Neural Network) for detecting political tweets
from a collection of 2, 000 congressmen tweets labeled as political
and non-political.
Analysis of Facebook ads. Andreou et al. [5] investigated the
level of transparency of Facebook explanations and showed that
the Facebook ad explanations are often incomplete and sometimes
misleading, while data explanations are often incomplete and vague.
In addition, Andreou et al. [4] characterized advertises on Facebook.
They found that a non-negligible fraction of advertisers belongs to
sensitive categories such as news and politics, and that there exist
many niche, unverified advertisers whose trustworthiness is diffi-
cult to estimate in an automated way. Also, their analyses revealed
that a significant amount of advertisers use targeting strategies
that can be characterized as invasive or opaque. In a related work,
18https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2017/02/28/facebook-advertising-
benchmarks
Speicher et al. [47] showed that a malicious advertiser can create
highly discriminatory ads without using sensitive attributes.
Recent papers studied how Russian ads were able to affect U.S.
citizens. Ribeiro et al. [19] investigated how malicious Russian ad-
vertisers were able to run ads with divisive or polarizing topics (e.g.,
immigration, race-based policing) at vulnerable subpopulations.
Authors have analyzed divisiveness of the ads based on topics that
caused different reactions among different social groups. Kim et
al. [27] used an ad tracking app that enabled them to trace the spon-
sors/sources of political campaigns and unpack targeting patterns.
Their empirical analysis identified “suspicious” groups, including
foreign entities, and operating divisive issue campaigns on Face-
book. Etudo et al. [13] also investigated the effects of Russian ads
and what is the relation with Black Lives Matter Protests. The study
found that Russian ads related to police brutality were issued to
coincide with periods of higher unrest.
Influence of social media on the general public. Concerning
the role of social media on the general public, Wang and Mark
[53] studied how college students engage with political and social
issues on Facebook and found that the impression management and
disclosure concerns strongly influence some people to refrain from
commenting or sharing content. However, there is evidence that
social media can create a public sphere that enables discussions
and deliberations [36]. For instance, Kou et. al. [28] analyzed the
public discourses about Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement on two
distinct social media sites, Facebook and Weibo. They show how
people on these two sites reasoned about the many incidents of
the movement and developed sometimes similar but other times
strikingly different discourses.
Despite enabling public discourse, social media can leverage
some problems such as biased content. For example, Kulshrestha et
al. [29] proposed a framework to quantify bias in politics-related
queries on Twitter. They found that both the input data and the rank-
ing system contribute significantly to produce varying amounts
of bias in the search results, what can have a significant impact
on the impression that users form about the different events and
politicians. Similarly, Gao et al. [20] conducted a controlled exper-
iment to study how stance labels to separate news articles with
opposing political ideologies help people explore diverse opinions.
Results show that stance labels may intensify selective exposure -
a tendency for people to look for agreeable opinions – and make
people more vulnerable to polarized opinions and fake news.
These latter two topics are problems analyzed by Che et al. [10],
who compared and contrasted the ways left- and right-wing news
organizations treat the concept of fake news in the context of the
highly polarized nature of U.S. news media as well as the evolving
and nebulous nature of fake news. They found some key differences.
While left-leaning sources discuss specific examples of fake news,
the narrative in right-leaning sources focuses on mainstream media
as a whole. Moreover, Garimella et al. [21] showed that people who
try to bridge the echo chambers, by sharing content with diverse
leaning, have to pay a “price of bipartisanship”, which is a latent
phenomenon that effectively stifles mediation between the two
sides.
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Table 3: Sample of ads in FbAdLibrary and Political Ads.
# Ad Text Ad and Advertiser Info
FbAdLibrary
AD1 The candidate Romeu Zema, tried once again, to hitch a ride in the campaign of Jair Messias Bolsonaro. This
time he didn’t make it, because people have already started to discover who he really is. #eleicoes2018
Public Figure
fb.com/deputadomarcosmontes
AD2 3 days to go! It was an incredible journey to get here receiving affection and support from so many people.
Check out the retrospective of my campaign and don’t forget: on October 7, vote 2332 for Deputado Federal RJ.
I count on you! bit.ly/2P8kkxz
Public Figure
fb.com/FlavioCavalcantiJunior
AD3 It is a great satisfaction to receive the support of Carlos Roberto Osorio. He will not run for reelection, but he
demonstrates that he has better security in Rio. Vote 40021 for state deputy - Renan Ferreirinha
Politician
fb.com/RenanFerreirinha/
AD4 Friends, in this final phase, I need your support! Anyone who has always followed my work knows that I did
a lot, but as #DeputadoEstadual I can do even more. Have you ever chosen11222 help me share it with your
friends and family? #AForçaDoInterior #NewPolicy #WellPolicy #CleanFile
Politician
fb.com/fabiomanfrinatobauru/
Political Ads
AD5 Proposal of Agenda #SegurançaPúblicaÉSolução: end impunity! Only increasing penalties does not solve
impunity: of what use a hundred years worth if the person responsible for the crime is not arrested? The work
to change that is to invest in research well made, which identifies criminals, dismantle gangs and arrest those
who commit violent crimes such as murder and rape. #NãoTáTudoBem #VamosResolver? Meet this and other
proposals to improve public security in Brazil: http://bit.ly/ResumoSegurançaPúblicaÉSolução
NGO
fb.com/institutosoudapaz/
AD6 The fight against Bolsonaro can only be effective if seen as part of the struggle of the working class against the
current system. Come to know the fight of the Communists. #ElesNão: Bolsonaro and other representatives of
capital.
Community
fb.com/EsquerdaMarxista/
AD7 [ELECTIONS 2018 - INTERVIEWWITH BISHOP DAMASCENO] Continuing the interviews of the Luziense
Observatory with candidates from Santa Luzia in the 2018 Elections, we talked with the city candidate for
Senate, Bishop Damasceno, of the PPL. Check out! #elections2018 #interview #senado #bispodamasceno #politics
#TVOL #santaluzia #observatorioluziense #luziar
News Media
fb.com/observatorioluziense/
AD8 Hi, Hi Dear People! For state representative, vote Luiz Carlos Martins - 11550! Politician
fb.com/luizcarlosmartinsoioi/
Influence of social media on election results. There is already
evidence that the action and interaction of voters in social me-
dia can influence their inclination to vote or not for a candidate.
Maruyama et al. [36] found a relation between Twitter use and the
voting choice. They investigated how using a social network while
watching a political event could influence the experience of a voter,
especially when the user actively participates by posting messages
about the event. Pal et al. [42] examined the function and public
reception of critical tweeting in online campaigns of four national-
ist populist politicians during major national election campaigns.
They found that cultural and political differences impact how each
politician employs their tactics. However, politicians are not only
the ones who try to influence the elections. Hemphill and Roback
[25] examined hundreds of citizen-authored tweets and the devel-
opment of a categorization scheme to describe common strategies
of lobbying on Twitter. Contrary to past research, they found that
assumed citizens used Twitter to merely shout out their opinions
on issues and utilize a variety of sophisticated techniques to im-
pact political outcomes. Finally, Tumasjan et al. [52] investigated
whether Twitter is used as a forum for political deliberation and
whether online messages on Twitter validly mirror offline political
sentiment. They concluded that the mere number of messages men-
tioning a party reflects the election result in the German federal
election.
Regarding the behavior of politicians in social media, Hwang
[26] analyzed how Korean young adults evaluate the use of Twitter
by South Korean politicians, perceive politicians’ credibility, and
evaluate politicians who use Twitter. The author concludes that
politicians who actively use Twitter are seen as more credible and,
as a consequence, are more positively evaluated by young adults.
Still in South Korea, Lee and Shin [32] and Lee et al. [33] designed
experiments to investigate how the level of interactivity in politi-
cians’ Twitter communication affects the public’s cognitive and
affective reactions. They found that exposure to high-interactivity
Twitter pages induce a stronger sense of direct conversation with
the candidate, which, in turn, led to more positive overall evalua-
tions of the candidate and a stronger intention to vote for him.
Our work is novel in many aspects and provides complementary
insights to the discussed studies. We focus on detecting political
content in advertisement with the aim of monitoring the misuse
of Facebook ads platform. Our paper highlights the importance
of independent auditing platforms for political ads and our effort
provides all the necessary framework to make it feasible.
7 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
In this work we presented a system for detecting political ads in
Facebook and which we deployed during the Brazilian 2018 elec-
tions19. Although we have only a small sample of the ads running in
Facebook, our approach was able to identify many ads with political
content that are not part of the Facebook Ad Library for political
ads. The main culprit for this situation is that advertisers need to
self-declare their political ads as such for them to appear in the Ad
19https://www.eleicoessemfake.dcc.ufmg.br/anuncios/
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Library. It is not clear whether Facebook has any mechanism to
enforce compliance.
The Brazilian election legislation stipulates that ads during the
electoral period need to be labeled with the Propaganda Electoral
tag display the national identification number (CPF for individuals
and CNPJ for institutions) of the advertiser. A small fraction of
advertisers in our dataset have the right disclaimer stipulated in the
Brazilian election law but they did not declare their ads as political
to Facebook, hence, they do not appear in the Ad Library.
While the results in our paper are undeniably worrying as there
are Brazilian advertisers that did not declare their political ads,
there is a positive side to it: we were able to exploit the ads self-
declared as political from compliant advertisers to build machine
learning-based models that can detect other similar ads coming
from advertisers that do not comply with the Facebook’s ToS or
electoral laws.
One limitation of our work is that our results refer exclusively
to the Brazilian scenario. We only tested machine learning-based
models trained on ads in Portuguese and evaluated them only on
ads during the 2018 Brazilian elections. Assessing the accuracy of
such techniques on ads in other languages and testing how well
these techniques are adapting to future elections remains an open
question. Because of that, we plan to analyze other elections using
the methodology described in this paper and our browser extension
continues to be live (https://adanalyst.mpi-sws.org/).
We hope our findings and all the real-world experience of de-
ploying a real system along the 2018 Brazilian elections will inform
debates around public policies that regulate political advertising on
the Internet. If a system like ours is implemented on a widespread
scale, political campaigns might adopt adversarial strategies that
change their marketing strategies in order to exploit our false neg-
ative rate. The existence of multiple independent auditing systems
would make the monitoring of political ads more robust to attackers.
We hope our effort will inspire other initiatives around the world.
Our paper not only highlights the importance of independent au-
diting platforms for political ads but also provides all necessary
framework to make it feasible as our code is open source.
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